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Abstract
Recent research has identified the heterogeneity as crucial for the evolution of
cooperation in spatial population. However, the influence of heterogeneous
noise is still lack. Inspired by this interesting question, in this work, we
try to incorporate heterogeneous noise into the evaluation of utility, where
only a proportion of population possesses noise, whose range can also be
tuned. We find that increasing heterogeneous noise monotonously promotes
cooperation and even translates the full defection phase (of the homogeneous
version) into the complete cooperation phase. Moreover, the promotion effect
of this mechanism can be attributed to the leading role of cooperators who
have the heterogeneous noise. These type of cooperators can attract more
agents penetrating into the robust cooperator clusters, which is beyond the
text of traditional spatial reciprocity. We hope that our work may shed light
on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in the society.
Keywords: Evolutionary Game, Spatial Reciprocity, Noise, Heterogeneity,
Network Dynamics
1. Introduction
Understanding the emergency of cooperation among the population of
selfish individuals denotes one challenge in natural and social science [1, 2].
To interpret the survival of cooperation, a theoretical framework that has
shed light onto this long-standing issue is the evolutionary game theory [3,
4, 5, 6]. In particular, a simple, paradigmatic model, the prisoners dilemma
(PD) game, has attracted much attention, both theoretical and experimental
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. In its basic version, two players simultaneously decide
to adopt one of two strategies: cooperation (C) and defection (D). They will
receive the reward R if both cooperate, and the punishment P if both defect.
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However, if one player defects while the other decides to cooperate, the former
will get the temptation T while the latter will get the sucker’s payoff S. These
payoffs satisfy the ranking T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S; thus, defection
optimizes the individual payoff, in spite of the fact that mutual cooperation
could yield a higher collective benefit. If no special mechanism is introduced
into the population, resulting is a social dilemma, which leads to widespread
defection.
During the past decades, a great number of scenarios has been proposed
that can overcome this dilemma and lead to the evolution of cooperation
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Whereas, Nowak attributed all these to five mech-
anisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reci-
procity, and group selection [20]. Among the five mechanisms, network reci-
procity, where players are arranged on the spatially structured topology and
interact only with their direct neighbors, has attracted the greatest interest
(for comprehensive reviews refer to Ref. [21]), because cooperators can sur-
vive by means of forming compact clusters, which minimize the exploitation
by defectors and protect those cooperators that are located in the interior
of such clusters. In line with this achievement, the role of spatial structure,
and its various underlying promoting mechanisms, in evolutionary games
have been intensively explored. Examples include heterogeneous activity
[22, 23, 24], complex networks [25, 26, 27], different rewiring mechanisms
[28, 29, 30, 31], reward and punishment mechanism [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37],
environment influence [38, 39], differences in evolutionary time scales [40, 41],
interdependent topology [42, 43, 44], the impact of reputation [45, 46], to
name but a few. Looking at some examples more specifically, in a recent
research framework [47, 48], where players were arranged on the diluted
spatial networks, an optimal state similar to the percolation theory could
maximize cooperation. In [49, 50] it was shown that the terminologies of
enduring (END) and expanding (EXP) periods could bright light to the un-
derstanding of the so-called ”spatial reciprocity”, even if the conditions did
not necessarily favor the spreading of cooperators.
Except for the above scenarios, another mechanism that attracts great
attention is the influence of noise on the evolution of cooperation. We can
examine some achievements up to now. When mapping the heterogeneous
strategy transfer capability to age structure, the robust promotion of coop-
eration was reported [51]. Moreover, the heterogeneity diversity of players
allowed for cooperative behavior to prevail even if the temptations to defect
were large [24]. Recently, it was shown if noise was involved into the payoffs
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of different strategies, cooperation was largely enhanced as well [52]. Al-
though it is undisputable that noise is a relevant ingredient when modeling
a population, there are, however, several aspects which greatly differentiates
from realistic situations. One situation of particular relevance that has re-
ceived relatively little is the case of heterogeneous noise, where some people
inherently poss the noise while this influence is congenitally eradicated for
some more. Inspired by this fact, one interesting question appears: if we in-
troduce heterogeneous noise into game model, is it beneficial for the evolution
of cooperation?
To unveil the answer of this puzzle, we thus study the prisoner’s dilemma
game with the consideration of heterogonous noise that maps to players’s fit-
ness. Comparing with the works of influence of merely noise, a proportion of
population is assumed to have noise and keep constant during the whole evo-
lution process. By means of numerical simulations we demonstrate, compared
with previous reports, that this simple mechanism can actually promote the
evolution of cooperation further. While the promotion trait is leaded by
the agents who have heterogeneous noise. In the remainder of this paper
we will first describe the considered evolutionary game, subsequently present
the main results, and summarize our conclusions finally.
2. Evolution Game Model
We consider an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game that is character-
ized with the temptation to defect T (the highest payoff received by a defector
if playing against a cooperator), reward for mutual cooperation R = 1, and
both the punishment for mutual defection P as well as the sucker’s payoff
S (the lowest payoff received by a cooperator if playing against a defector)
equaling 0. As a standard practice, 1 < T ≤ 2 ensures a proper payoff rank-
ing (T > R > P ≥ S) and captures the essential social dilemma between
individual and common interests [53]. It is worth mentioning that though
we choose a simply and weak version (namely, S = 0), our observations are
robust and can be observed in the full parameterized space as well [54].
Throughout this work, each player x is initially designated either as a
cooperator (C) or defector (D) with equal probability. Two types of play-
ers are distinguished and their spatial distribution is described by an Ising
formalism (nx = A or B). The portion of players A (B) is ν (1 − ν) and
keeps constant during the whole simulation process. With respect to the
interaction network, we choose the L × L regular lattice with four nearest
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neighbors and periodic boundary conditions. The game is iterated forward
in accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising the
following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x evaluates
his utility Ux based on the acquired payoff Px by playing the game with its
nearest neighbors. Then, it chooses at random one neighbor y who also gets
his utility Uy in the same way and adopts the strategy sy from the selected
player y with the probability
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Ux − Uy)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the uncertainties, or intensity of selection [55, 56]. Since
the effect of K has been extensively investigated [55, 57], we simply fix the
value of K to be K = 0.1 in the present work. With regard to the utility Ux,
it can be defined in the following way
Ux = Fx × ǫ, (2)
where reflect the influence of noise, which introduces the noise into the utility,
similar to previous treatment [55]. Importantly, if player x belongs to A type,
it will be assigned one uniformly distributed random number Λ in the interval
[-1,1]. In this case, we can get the value of ǫ = ηΛ, where η is used to control
the range of random number. On the contrary, given that player x is type
B, ǫ equals to 0 (namely, there is no the influence of noise). Obviously, when
η = 0 (or ν = 0), it will turn to the traditionally homogeneous case [55],
while positive values incorporates heterogeneous noise. During one full Monte
Carlo step (MCS) each player has a chance to adopt one of the neighboring
strategies once on average.
Results of Monte Carlo simulations presented below were obtained on
200 × 200 lattices. Key quantity the fraction of cooperators ρC was deter-
mined within the last 104 full MCS over the total 2 × 105 steps. Moreover,
since the heterogeneous distribution may introduce additional disturbances,
the final results were averaged over up to 100 independent realizations for
each set of parameter values in order to assure suitable accuracy.
3. Results and Analysis
We start by examine how cooperation trait varies under the influence
of heterogeneous noise. Figure 1 features the color map encoding the final
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fraction of cooperation ρC on the ν − η parameter plane. For η = 0 (or
ν = 0, which can be regarded as the baseline), it returns the traditional ver-
sion, where the weight of utility is identical among agents and cooperation
vanishes under even small temptation to defection. However, when heteroge-
neous noise is introduced, we can see that everything changes. It is obvious
that increasing η and ν enhances the maximally required temptation that is
needed for cooperator to survive. What is more, the span of cooperators and
defectors coexisting expands too, ultimately leading also to an ever-broader
arrival to the pure C phase as increases further. More precisely, the mini-
mally required b of cooperation survival is above 1.0375 for η = ν = 0, but it
becomes possible for the dominance of cooperation at b = 1.08 (under η > 0
and ν > 0). This is certainly impressive and motivating for trying to under-
stand the mechanism behind the remarkable promotion of social cooperation.
These results suggest that when heterogeneous noise incorporated into the
evaluation of utility plays an important role in facilitating the prosperity of
cooperation. In what follows we will systematically examine the validity of
this claim.
It is therefore of interest to proceed with exploring the spatial distribution
of strategies under the influence of heterogeneous noise. Results presented in
Fig. 2 hint to the performance of the case, where cooperators and defectors
of type A are colored by blue and yellow, while the same classes of type B are
marked by green and red. Irrespective of which case, what first attracts our
attention is that the change of cooperator clusters, through which cooperators
can survive and resist the exploitation of defectors. As evidenced in the left
panel (small value of ν or η), there is slight distribution of heterogeneous
noise, cooperators goes still extinct, thus yielding an exclusive dominance
of defectors. With the increment of ν or η (middle panel), a fraction of
cooperators can survive on the lattice by means of forming clusters, thereby
protecting themselves against the exploitation by defectors. Moreover, it is
worth mentioning that these clusters are usually small and discrete, which
to some extent helps to explain why it is impossible to yield the absolute
dominance of cooperators. However, if the heterogeneity is sufficient strong
(right panel), one can see that cooperators prevail even reach their undisputed
dominance, whereby clustering remains their mechanism of spreading and
survivability. Compared with the left panel, it is obvious that the clusters of
cooperators become larger and more compact, which further results in less
space left for defectors. More importantly, cooperators of type A (AC, blue)
are basically located at the centers of clusters, while cooperators of type B
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(BC, green) lie along the boundaries of clusters (see Fig.2 for more details).
We argue that cooperators of type A (who posses the noise) play a crucial role
in sustaining the large clusters of cooperators. Namely, during the evolution
process, cooperators of type A will be chosen more likely as potential strategy
donors, which induces more cooperators approaching and surrounding them.
Consequently, the initial clusters warranted start mushrooming to depress the
invasion of defectors. It is also natural that their followers, i.e., cooperators
of type B, usually lie along the boundaries. In a sea of cooperators this is
practically always these followers rather than defectors trying to penetrate
into the clusters. This kind of expansion ultimately results in highly robust
clusters of cooperators that goes beyond the observation supported by spatial
reciprocity alone [53, 55].
In order to explain the promotive impact of heterogeneous noise on the
evolution of cooperation, it is subsequently instructive to examine time courses
of ρC for different values of the parameter η (or ν, due to the similar evolution
tide, we do not repeat it). Figure 3 features how cooperation evolves under
different scenarios. What first attracts great attention is the early stages of
evolutionary process (irrespective of the values of η), where the performance
of defectors is better than that of cooperators. This is given that defectors
are, as individuals, more successful than cooperators and will thus be cho-
sen more likely as potential strategy donors (similar to the characteristics of
EXP period in recent literatures [49? ]). Moreover, we also note a fact that
the small the value of η, the faster the decline of cooperation. This should
be related with the distribution of noise, which has be proved that broader
distribution of heterogeneous noise is beneficial for the extension of coopera-
tion clusters from Fig.2. However, with the evolution proceeding, interesting
phenomenon takes place. For small value of η, the decline of cooperation
can not stop till the absolute dominance of defector. While for larger value
of η, it quickly restrains from the exploitation of defectors and is in favor of
the prosperity of cooperators. Obviously, larger value of η can lead to earlier
reverse of cooperators (the advantage of of defectors is weakened largely)
and finally reach higher level of cooperation. Among this expansion process,
broad distribution of cooperators of type A plays a crucial role: these cooper-
ators attract more individuals to form effective clusters through inducing the
transformation from defectors to cooperators. The clusters built by cooper-
ators are impervious to the lure of becoming defectors and able to recover
the space of defectors, which ultimately results in widespread cooperation.
Thus, we argue that the early forming of clusters composed by cooperators
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of type A is determinative, the existence of which can results in widespread
cooperation going beyond the tradition version [53, 55].
Finally, it remains of interest to validate the role of cooperators type A
for the effective expansion of clusters. Figure 4 shows the evolution snap-
shots of particular state: there initially are two circular cooperator domains.
It is visually clear that cooperator domains where there is no noise (green
circular domain) will suffer from the impingement of defectors. In this case,
cooperators initially belonging to this circle can only maintain their territory
for a short time (namely, the green circle will vanish soon and is replaced by
defectors). Quite surprisingly, the fate of the circular domain of type A (blue
circle) is fully different. The domain is always robust, but more importantly
is that it can attract more defectors to becomes cooperators. That is to say,
these cooperators are impervious to defector attacks, and at the same time
let more agents penetrate into the clusters, which eventually causes coopera-
tion spreading across the whole network. Therefore, this fig provides a direct
proof that cooperators possessing heterogeneous noise play a significant role
for the effective expansion of cooperation behavior, which can be regarded
as a valuable clue to explaining more social dilemmas [58, 59, 60].
4. Summary
To sum, we have studied the influence of heterogeneous noise on the evo-
lution of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Different from pre-
vious works about noise, we allow part of agents to possess noise, which can
be incorporated into the evaluation of utility. Through systematic computer
simulations, we have found that heterogeneous noise is greatly beneficial
for enhancing cooperation level (namely, facilitates the spatial reciprocity).
While the essence of this promotion effect can be attributed to the leading
role of cooperators who possess noise. These cooperators not only resist the
exploitation of defectors, but also promote the transformation of defectors to
cooperators. Except for the time course, we provide a direct observation for
this argument as well. Since various types of dilemmas are ubiquitous in our
life, this simple mechanism can supply the clue for more cases. Moreover,
we also hope that it can inspire further study for some social puzzles via a
co-evolutionary process [4] and its application [61, 62].
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Figure 1: Color map encoding the fraction of cooperators ρC on the ν−η parameter plane.
When ν = 0 (or η = 0), it returns to the classical homogeneous version, where cooperation
dies out soon. After introducing heterogeneous noise, we can see that cooperation is
obviously promoted with the increment of ν and η, namely, heterogeneous noise enhances
spatial reciprocity. The values of b are 1.03 and 1.08 for panels a and b, respectively.
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Figure 2: Characteristic snapshots of strategy distributions on the square lattice. Top
row depicts results for the fraction of type A ν = 0.7, while from left (a) to right (c)
the values of η are 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively. Bottom panels shows the results for the
parameter value η = 0.6, while from left (d) to right (f) the values of ν are 0.1, 0.5 and
0.9. Cooperators of type A (AC) and B (BC) are colored blue and green, respectively.
Defectors of type A (AD) and B (BD), on the other hand, are colored yellow and red. If
comparing the snapshots horizontally, it can be observed that larger values of η (top) or ν
(bottom) clearly promote the evolution of cooperation. More importantly, except for the
left panel, AC are always located in the center of the giant clusters, according to which
we guess that this type of cooperators can promote the effective expansion of cooperator
clusters. All the results are obtained for b=1.08.
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Figure 3: Time courses of the fraction of cooperators ρC independence on different values
of η. Obviously, larger value of η can stop the drop of cooperation at earlier stage and
then turns it to the expansion of cooperation. The large the value of eta, the higher the
final level of cooperation. During this process, the cooperators of type A plays a crucial
role for leading the effective expansion of clusters. All the results are obtained for ν = 0.7
and b=1.08.
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Figure 4: Evolution snapshots of the clusters of cooperators on the square lattice. From
a to f, the time steps are 0, 10, 50, 200, 1000 and 100000, respectively. Different from
previous treatments, there is a prepared initial state: two circular cooperative domains are
present on both networks [one is for type A, (AC-blue), another domian is for type of B,
(BC-green)], other agents are arranged as defectors. Except for blue domain, individuals
of type A are randomly chosen from defector (AD-yellow) to keep the value of η accurate.
This fig gives the direct observation for the leading role of AC, which can enable defectors
to penetrate into the cooperator clusters. All the results are obtained for η = 0.75, ν = 0.75
and b=1.08.
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